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CASES NOTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION-
THE BURDEN OF PROOF'
The plaintiff flied suit against the defendants alleging specific acts
of malpractice. Each of the defendants, pursuant to the Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure,2 moved for summary judgment and in support of
their motions filed affidavits with the court. The plaintiff filed an oppos-
ing affidavit which subsequently, on defendants' motion, was stricken
from the record as legally insufficient. Summary final judgment was en-
tered for the defendants. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 3
The plaintiff sought review by the Supreme Court through certiorari pro-
ceedings. The Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded: Before it
becomes necessary to determine the legal sufficiency of documents offered
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, it must first be shown
that the movant has conclusively established the non-existence of mate-
rial issues of fact. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1967).
The rulings of the trial court and the district court of appeal were
based upon a finding that the affidavit offered in opposition to the motion
was legally insufficient.4 The district court of appeal concluded that
summary judgment was properly entered for the defendant-movant be-
cause his opponent had failed to come forth with evidence sufficient to
establish the existence of factual issues. As authority for its position the
court relied on Hardcastle v. Mobley.5 In Hardcastle, the plaintiff, at-
tempting to enforce a contract to make a will, sought to introduce in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment an affidavit swearing to
the existence of witnesses to whom the deceased had admitted the oral
contract. The court stated:
1. The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of the evidentiary showing required
on a motion for summary judgment and the effect of that burden on the negligence action.
For a general analysis of the rule see Massey and Westen, Seventh Survey of Florida Law;
Civil Procedure, 20 U. MIAmi L. REv. 668 (1966); Massey and Westen, Sixth Survey of
Florida Law; Civil Procedure, 18 U. MIAmi L. REV. 754 (1964).
2. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c):
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3. Holl v. Talcott, 171 So.2d 412 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
4. The affidavit offered in support of the motion alleged conformity to local medical
standards. The opposing affidavit alleged that the act did not conform to the required stand-
ard. Though the decision went to the procedural error, the supreme court did express a feel-
ing that the opposing affidavit did sufficiently establish the existence of factual issues and,
therefore, the district court of appeal and the trial court had erred in their finding of legal
insufficiency.
5. 143 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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[T]he party moved against by summary judgment or sum-
mary decree must come forward with fact contradicting those
submitted by the movant and demonstrating a real issue between
the parties.'
Thus the failure of an opponent to a motion for summary judgment to
either support the allegations in his complaint' or to counter those of-
fered by the movant would prove fatal to his claim.8 Under such circum-
stances the court would presume that the opponent had gone as far as he
could and summary judgment would be entered for the movant.°
However, a different rule was established by the Second District
Court of Appeal in Martarese v. Leesburg Elks Club.'" In Martarese, the
plaintiff sued for damages sustained when he slipped and fell on the
defendant's dance floor. The defendant moved for summary judgment
and in support of the motion offered the deposed plaintiff's admission that
he could not of his own knowledge explain what caused him to fall. The
motion was granted. The district court of appeal reversed because the
defendant-movant had failed to show the non-existence of material issues
of fact. The appellate court, relying on federal practice and procedure,
cited Moore" in pointing out that:
A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of estab-
lishing by a record that is adequate for the decision of the legal
questions presented that there is no triable issue of material
fact; and he has the burden even as to issues upon which the
opposing party would have the trial burden. If the moving party
fails to shoulder his burden the motion should be denied, even
though the opposing party has presented no evidentiary ma-
terials ....
The supreme court adopted the holding of the Martarese case, which
is essentially the position adopted by a majority of other jurisdictions.'2
6. Id. at 717. (emphasis supplied).
7. See Herring v. Eiland, 81 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1955).
8. See Pritchard v. Peppercorn & Peppercorn, Inc., 96 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1957).
9. Hardcastle v. Mobley, 143 So.2d 715, 717 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
10. 171 So.2d 606 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
11. 6 J. MooRE, FEDEA PRAc'ricE § 56.23 (2d ed. 1966). It is significant to note that
the Florida position and the Federal position appear to be identical. The quote from Moore
indicates that the opponent need not file opposing documents until it has been determined
that the movant has satisfied his burden. However, it would appear that unless the opponent
is prepared, and does in fact file opposing affidavits, he will find himself in a precarious
position because of the provision in the rules requiring the fulfilling of documents one day
prior to the consideration on the motion. It would appear that if the burden is shifted to
the opponent and he has failed to support his position, he will thereafter be unable to file
documents in support of his cause. See Hardcastle v. Mobley, 143 So.2d 717 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965).
12. Stationers Corp. v. Dunn and Bradstreet Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785 (Sup.
Ct. 1965); Tidewater Oil So. v. Murphy Motors Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 160, 227 A.2d 443
(1967); Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light, 216 A.2d 281 (Del. 1966); Christiansen v.
Rumsey, 429 P.2d 416 (Idaho 1967); Dowdy v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 384 S.W.2d 282
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However, there are cases which impose on the movant only a slight bur-
den of proof.18 Furthermore, as recently as 1967 it has been held that
the burden rests initially on the opponent to the motion.1
4
In the instant case,' 5 the view of the Third District Court of Appeal
in Hardcastle was described as faulty and in direct conflict with the
supreme court decision in Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley." In Harvey
the action was based on injuries sustained when the plaintiff fell in the
lobby of the defendant's building. The trial court entered summary final
judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiff that a motion for summary
judgment should not be granted where it could be inferred from the
evidence that the plaintiff could sustain his trial burden of proof and
reversed. 7 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida the defendant
relied on the "Hardcastle Rule." However, the court stated:
A movant for summary judgment has the burden of demon-
strating that there is no issue of any material fact. All doubts
regarding the existence of an issue are to be resolved against
the movant, and the evidence presented at the hearing plus
favorable inferences reasonably justified thereby are liberally
construed in favor of the opponent.' 8
A careful reading of the instant case indicates that the action of the dis-
trict court of appeal, using Hardcastle as authority on a problem identi-
cal with Harvey Building, was prompted by a feeling that the "Hard-
castle Rule" was the only way to preserve for the litigants in a negli-
gence action the right to effectively utilize summary judgment procedure.
Florida courts have long recognized that the summary judgment
procedure is in derogation of the right to trial by jury. 9 The case law
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Mecham v. Colby, 156 Neb. 386, 56 N.W.2d 299 (1960); Bd. of Educ.
of Town of Morristown v. Palmer, 88 N.J. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 564 (1965) ; Oxford Paper
Co. v. S.M. Liquidation Co., 45 Misc.2d 612, 257 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1965); Rukavina v. New
York Cent. Ry., 1 Ohio App.2d 48, 203 NE.2d 495 (1964); Gulbenkian v. Penn, 252 S.W.2d
929 (Texas 1952) ; Reed v. Davis, 399 P.2d 338 (Wash. 1965).
13. See Dobson v. Grand Inter. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs. 101 Ariz. 501, 421 P.2d 520
(1966) and Schoenfeld v. Modern Silver Linen Supply Co., 279 App. Div. 49, 107 N.Y.S.2d
861 (1951) wherein the courts stated that they do not require a conclusive showing of the
non-existence of genuine issues of fact. The burden of proof is shifted to the opponent upon
a prima facie showing of the absence of genuine material issues of fact.
14. See, e.g., Geyser Co. v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 299 A.2d 499 (Super. Ct.
Del. 1967) wherein it is stated that on a motion for summary judgment it is incumbent on
the party moved against to come forward with documents sufficient to establish the exist-
ence of genuine material issues of fact.
15. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
16. 175 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1965).
17. Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 168 So.2d 330 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
18. Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782 (Fla. 1965).
19. Drahota v. Taylor Constr. Inc., 89 So.2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1956) wherein the court
stated:
The constitutional right to a jury trial demands that particular care be accorded
in this field, to the end that controverted issues of fact be resolved not upon plead-
ings and depositions but by a jury functioning under proper instructions.
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interpretation of the rule reflects that principle and it has been held that
summary judgment or decree is a drastic remedy which must be cau-
tiously administered.2" A party moving for summary judgment must show
conclusively that no material issues of fact remain for trial.2 The burden
of a party moving for summary judgment is greater, not less, than that
of plaintiff at trial.22 The presumptions which favor the opponent to the
motion continue throughout the entire consideration on the motion, 3
and the opposing party's papers are to be liberally read and construed,
as opposed to a strict reading of the movant's papers.24
The burden imposed by the aforementioned rules weighs heavily on
the movant in the negligence action. Given the nature of the evidentiary
showing required by the principal case25 and those presumptions favoring
the opponent outlined above, it appears that our courts will have little
trouble, if any, in finding issues of fact in a negligence action. Thus it
is unlikely that the defendant in a malpractice action, when armed only
with the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and
the admissions on file will be able to conclusively prove: (1) that the
act was not a negligent act; (2) that the harm was not proximately
caused by the act; or (3) that the plaintiff cannot sustain his trial burden
of proof. 26 The task is formidable enough on trial; as a pre-trial require-
ment it approaches impossibility.
In Florida the rule adopted in the instant case is not discriminatory.
It does appear, however, that the interpretation and criteria of the rule
have limited27 its effective use to non-negligence actions despite a Florida
Supreme Court statement to the contrary.
28
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20. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami v. George Constr. Corp., 166 So.2d 155, 158 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1964).
21. Leaks v. Adeimy 195 So.2d 47 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
22. Visingardi v. Tirone, 193 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1966).
23. This view is expressed in the principal case, Holl, and appears to be consistent with
the other principles expressed.
24. This statement is expressed in the principal case and has support from prior deci-
sions. See Prescott v. Erwin, 133 So.2d 332 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Remington v. L.P. Gun-
son & Co., 125 So.2d 885 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Tarkoff v. Schmunk, 117 So.2d 442 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1960).
25. The evidentiary showing required by the principal case is a conclusive showing of
the non-existence of genuine issues of fact.
26. In Holl, the petitioners on rehearing contended that the action of the court would
preclude the use of summary judgment procedure in negligence actions. In response the court
stated that they had not done so, that the petitioner had only to show: 1) that the act was
not negligent 2) that the harm was not proximately caused by the act or 3) that the plain-
tiff could not sustain his trial burden of proof. It appears that the court was not responsive
to the plea of the petitioner.
27. The author does not contend that the holding in the principal case absolutely pre-
cludes the use of summary judgment procedure in negligence actions. There will be negli-
gence actions wherein the facts lend themselves to the procedure. However, the technical
aspects of many negligence actions will necessarily place it well beyond the narrow scope of
the rule.
28. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 47 (Fla. 1967).
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